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Abstract—Despite extensive research on cryptography, secure
and efficient query processing over outsourced data remains an
open challenge. This paper continues along the emerging trend
in secure data processing that recognizes that the entire dataset
may not be sensitive, and hence, non-sensitivity of data can be
exploited to overcome limitations of existing encryption-based
approaches. We propose a new secure approach, entitled query
binning (QB) that allows non-sensitive parts of the data to be
outsourced in clear-text while guaranteeing that no information
is leaked by the joint processing of non-sensitive data (in clear-
text) and sensitive data (in encrypted form). QB maps a query
to a set of queries over the sensitive and non-sensitive data in
a way that no leakage will occur due to the joint processing
over sensitive and non-sensitive data. Interestingly, in addition to
improve performance, we show that QB actually strengthens the
security of the underlying cryptographic technique by preventing
size, frequency-count, and workload-skew attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have witnessed the development of
secure and privacy-preserving encryption-based [1]–[3] or
secret-sharing-based [4]–[7] techniques to realize the database
as a service model. Despite significant progress, a crypto-
graphic approach that is both secure (i.e., no leakage of
sensitive data to the adversary) and efficient (in terms of time)
simultaneously has proved to be very challenging. Broadly,
work on cryptography to support secure outsourcing has taken
the following directions:
Techniques that support strong security guarantees. The
leading example of which is fully homomorphic encryp-
tion [1], which when mixed with oblivious-RAM (ORAM) [3],
offers possibly amongst the most secure mechanisms. How-
ever, such mechanisms incur high computational overhead.
Techniques that do not depend on the data encryption
but provide strong security, especially, information-theoretic
security, by distributing a value in the form of the secret-
shares to non-colluding clouds. Shamir’s secret-sharing [4],
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distributed point functions (DPF) [6], and function secret-
sharing (FSS) [7] are a few examples of such techniques. Such
methods often limit the type of operations one can perform
while imposing high overhead in terms of communication.
Techniques that try to support a wide range of operations
including index-based retrieval or joins, such as CryptDB [8],
Arx [9], searchable encryption [2], and cryptographic in-
dexes [10]. Such techniques often trade security for perfor-
mance; for instance, techniques that depend on deterministic
and order-preserving encryptions, traversal of the index by
the cloud, or leakage of the searching token do not offer
strong security. Papers [11], [12] show that order-preserving
and deterministic encryption techniques when used together,
on a dataset in which the entropy of the values is not high
enough can leak the entire data in clear-text to an attacker
through frequency analysis on the encrypted data.
Techniques/systems that exploit secure hardware (Intel
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) [13]), e.g., M2R [14],
VC3 [15], Opaque [16], and EnclaveDB [17]. Such techniques
also leak information during a query execution due to different
attacks on SGX (e.g., cache-line, branch shadowing, and
page-fault attacks [18], [19]) and are significantly slow when
overcoming these attacks using ORAM-based computations or
emerging architectures such as T-SGX [20] or Sanctum [21].
Given the state of the research, this paper explores a
radically different approach to secure outsourcing that scales
cryptographic mechanisms using database techniques while
providing strong security guarantees. Our work is motivated
by recent works on the hybrid cloud that has exploited the
fact that for a large class of application contexts, data can be
partitioned into sensitive and non-sensitive components [22]–
[24]. Such a classification, which is common in industries
for secure computing [25], [26] and done via appropriately
using existing techniques surveyed in [27]; for example, (i)
inference detection using graph-based semantic data model-
ing [28], (ii) user-defined relationships between sensitive and
non-sensitive data [29], (iii) constraints-based mechanisms,
(iv) sensitive patterns hiding using sanitization matrix [30], and
(v) common knowledge-based association rules [31]. However,
it is important to mention here that non-sensitive data can,
over time, become sensitive and/or lead to inferences about
sensitive data. This is an inevitable risk of the approaches that
exploit sensitive data classification. Note that all the above-
mentioned work based on sensitive/non-sensitive classification
make a similar assumption. Indeed, another way to view this
assumption is that today, cloud solutions, already outsource
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databases without encryption and are risking the loss of not
just non-sensitive data but also sensitive data.
Based on data classification into sensitive and non-sensitive
data, secure solutions for hybrid cloud have been devel-
oped [22]–[24]. These solutions outsource only non-sensitive
data and enjoy both the benefits of the public cloud as well as
strong security guarantees (without revealing sensitive data to
an adversary). While these techniques provide an effective and
secure solution, they are, however, requiring data owners to
maintain potentially unbounded storage locally and also suffer
from significant inter-cloud communication overheads.
Our goal, in this paper, is to explore how sensitive and
non-sensitive classification can be exploited by secure data
processing techniques that store the entire data in the public
cloud to bring new efficiencies to secure data processing.
In particular, in the envisioned public cloud model, data is
stored in a partitioned way – sensitive data is secured using
any existing cryptographic technique (unlike the hybrid cloud
solution where the owner stores the sensitive data) and non-
sensitive data resides in plaintext. Query processing is also
split into encrypted and plaintext query processing. We refer
to this as partitioned computing. Unlike the case of the hybrid
cloud, when implementing partitioned computing at a public
cloud, data processing performed on the sensitive and non-
sensitive parts of the data may reveal exact encrypted tuples
and cleartext tuples that satisfy the query to the adversary.
Consequently, this leads to inferences about sensitive data,
which will be explained in detail in §II.
We define a security model (§III) that formally states
what it means to be secure in partitioned computing. We
then develop a query binning (QB) approach that realizes
secure partitioned computing for selection queries. We focus
on selection queries for several reasons. First, selection queries
are important in their own right. For instance, several key-
value stores (e.g., Amazon Dynamo) and document stores
(e.g., MongoDB) focus exclusively on selection queries (with
limited support for joins). Furthermore, most cryptographic
research has also focused on selection queries [1]–[3], [6].
Since our goal is to speed up existing cryptographic techniques
(and not to extend their functionality and make them resilient
against attacks, such as order-revealing, inferences from deter-
ministic encryptions, leakages from SGX, and different side-
channel attacks [11], [12], [19]), we focus on selection queries.
Nonetheless, there are recent work on cryptographic joins [32]
and also on joins using SGX [16]. These approaches, however,
are not yet practical, e.g., from the efficiency perspective,
Opaque [16] takes 89 seconds to execute a selection query
on a dataset of size 700MB. The same query takes about
0.2 milliseconds over cleartext processing. Also, systems, e.g.,
Opaque, support limited operations (only primary-to-foreign
key joins) and, furthermore, leaks information due to cache-
line, page table-based, branch shadowing, and output-size
attacks [18], [19]. Many of these attacks can be overcome with
expensive ORAM techniques, and the QB approach alongside
such approaches can be exploited to improve efficiency.
We show two interesting effects of using QB: (i) By avoid-
ing cryptographic processing on non-sensitive data, the joint
cost of communication and computation of QB is significantly
less than the computation cost of a strongly secure crypto-
graphic technique1 (e.g., homomorphic encryptions, DPF [6],
or secret-sharing-based technique [5]) on the entire encrypted
data; and hence, QB improves the performance of strong
cryptographic techniques over a large-scale dataset (§V). (ii)
QB provides an enhanced security by preventing several at-
tacks such as output size, frequency-count, and workload-skew
attacks, even when the underlying cryptographic technique is
susceptible to such attacks (§VI).
Contributions. The primary contributions of this paper are:
(i) A formal definition of partitioned data security when
jointly processing sensitive and non-sensitive data (§III). (ii)
An efficient QB approach (§IV) that guarantees partitioned
data security, supporting cloud-side-indexes, and that can be
built on top of any cryptographic technique. (iii) An analytical
model and experimental validation to show the effectiveness
of QB over a strong secure cryptographic technique (§V). (iv)
A weak cryptographic technique (e.g., cloud-side indexable
techniques [9], [10] ) becomes secure and efficient when mixed
with QB (§VI).
Full version. [34] provides the full version of this paper. The
full version provides: (i) formal security and computational
complexity proofs of QB, (ii) extensions of QB to deal with
non-identical searchable attribute-based column-level sensitiv-
ity, join, and range queries, (iii) some additional experiments to
show insert and the use of indexable cryptographic techniques,
and (iv) an analytical formal security model to compare QB
with a pure cryptographic technique under different conditions
and different security levels such as preventing size, frequency-
count, and workload-skew attacks. QB can also be extended
to support group-by aggregation queries as well; however,
extending it to support nested queries is more complex and
will need a significant extension.
Related work on secure selection queries. Broadly, existing
research on secure selection query execution techniques can
be classified into four categories, as follows: (i) Encryption-
based techniques examples of which include order-preserving
encryption, deterministic encryption, homomorphic encryp-
tion [1], searchable encryption [2], and ORAM [3]. (ii) Secret-
sharing [4] based techniques that include DPF [6], FSS [7],
and [5]. (iii) Trusted-hardware-based techniques that include
[14]–[17]. (iv) Sensitivity-based techniques. MapReduce [22],
[23] and SQL data processing [24]. Both MapReduce and SQL
1QB trades off increased communication costs for executing queries,
while reducing very significantly cryptographic operations. This tradeoff
significantly improves performance, especially, when using cryptographic
mechanisms, e.g., fully homomorphic encryption that takes several seconds to
compute a single operation [33], secret-sharing-based techniques that take a
few seconds [5], or techniques such as bilinear maps that take over 1.5 hours
to perform joins on a dataset of size less than 10MB [32]. When considering
such cryptography, increased communication overheads are fully compensated
by the savings. A similar observation, albeit in a very different context was
also observed in [23] in the context of MapReduce, where overshuffling to
prevent the adversary to infer sensitive keys in the context of hybrid cloud
was shown to be significantly better compared to private side operations.
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execution solutions work on the principle of sensitivity-based
data partitioning over the hybrid cloud.
Each of the above strategies has resulted in corresponding
systems that support secure data processing; e.g., CryptDB [8],
Arx [9], and Opaque [16] are some novel encryption-based
systems. Likewise, Microsoft Always Encrypted, Oracle 12c,
Amazon Aurora, and MariaDB are industrial secure encrypted
databases. DSSE-based SDB [35] is a secret-sharing and
encryption-based system while Arx [9] and Opaque [16] work
on the data sensitivity principle.
These systems/techniques are unable to prevent one or
more of the following attacks: (i) size attack, i.e., an adversary
having some background knowledge can deduce the full/partial
outputs by simply observing the output sizes [16]; (ii) fre-
quency attack, i.e., an adversary can deduce how many tuples
have an identical value [11]; (iii) workload-skew attack, i.e., an
adversary, having the knowledge of frequent selection queries
by observing many queries, can estimate which encrypted
tuples potentially satisfy the frequent section selection queries;
(iv) access-pattern attack, i.e., addresses of encrypted tuples
that satisfy the query. Note that computationally expensive
and access-pattern-hiding cryptographic techniques (e.g., PIR,
ORAM, DSSE, and secret-sharing) can prevent the size,
frequency-count, and workload-skew attacks only on non-
skewed and non-deterministically encrypted datasets. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no cryptographic technique
that prevents all the four attacks on a skewed dataset. Table I
shows notations used in this paper.
II. PARTITIONED COMPUTATION
In this section, we first define more precisely what we
mean by partitioned computing, illustrate how such a com-
putation can leak information due to the joint processing of
sensitive and non-sensitive data, discuss the corresponding
security definition, and finally discuss system and adversarial
models under which we will develop our solutions.
The Partition Computation Model. We assume the following
two entities in our model:
A trusted database (DB) owner who divides a relation R
having attributes, say A1, A2, . . . , An, into the following two
relations based on row-level data sensitivity: Rs and Rns
containing all sensitive and non-sensitive tuples, respectively.
The DB owner outsources the relation Rns to a public cloud.
The tuples of the relation Rs are encrypted using any existing
non-deterministic encryption mechanism before outsourcing to
the same public cloud. In our setting, the DB owner has to
store metadata such as searchable values and their frequency
counts, which will be used for appropriate query formulation.
The DB owner is assumed to have sufficient storage for
such metadata, and also computational capabilities to perform
encryption and decryption. The size of metadata is smaller
than the size of the original data.
The untrusted public cloud that stores the databases, executes
queries, and provides answers.
Let us consider a query q over the relation R, denoted
by q(R). A partitioned computation strategy splits the exe-
Notations Meaning
|S| (or |NS |) Number of sensitive (or non-sensitive) data values
Rs (or Rns ) Sensitive (or non-sensitive) parts of a relation R
si (or nsj ) ith sensitive (or jth non-sensitive) value
SB (or NSB) The number of sensitive (or non-sensitive) bins
SBi (or NSBi) ith sensitive (or non-sensitive) bin
|SB| = y (or
|NSB| = x)
Sensitive (or non-sensitive) values in a sensitive (or non-sensitive)
bin or the size of a sensitive (or non-sensitive) bin
q(w) A query, q, for a predicate w
q(Wns)(Rns) A query, q, for a set, Wns , of predicates in clear-text over Rns
q(Ws)(Rs) A query, q, for a set, Ws, of predicates in encrypted form over Rs
q(W )(Rs, Rns)[A] A query, q, for a set, W , of values, searching on the attribute, A,
of the relations Rs and Rns , where W = Ws ∪Wns
E(ti) i
th encrypted tuple
Table I: Notations used in the paper.
EId FirstName LastName SSN Office Dept
t1 E101 Adam Smith 111 1 Defense
t2 E259 John Williams 222 2 Design
t3 E199 Eve Smith 333 2 Design
t4 E259 John Williams 222 6 Defense
t5 E152 Clark Cook 444 1 Defense
t6 E254 David Watts 555 4 Design
t7 E159 Lisa Ross 666 2 Defense
t8 E152 Clark Cook 444 3 Design
Figure 1: A relation: Employee.
cution of q into two independent subqueries: q(Rs): a query
to be executed on the encrypted sensitive relation Rs, and
q(Rns): a query to be executed on the non-sensitive relation
Rns . The final result is computed (using a query qmerge ) by
appropriately merging the results of the two subqueries at the
DB owner side. In particular, the query q on a relation R is
partitioned, as follows: q(R) = qmerge
(
q(Rs), q(Rns)
)
.
EId SSN
E101 111
E259 222
E199 333
E152 444
E254 555
E159 666
(a) A sensitive rela-
tion: Employee1.
EId FirstName LastName Office Dept
t1 E101 Adam Smith 1 Defense
t4 E259 John Williams 6 Defense
t5 E152 Clark Cook 1 Defense
t7 E159 Lisa Ross 2 Defense
(b) A sensitive relation: Employee2.
EId FirstName LastName Office Dept
t2 E259 John Williams 2 Design
t3 E199 Eve Smith 2 Design
t6 E254 David Watts 4 Design
t8 E152 Clark Cook 3 Design
(c) A non-sensitive relation: Employee3.
Figure 2: Three relations obtained from Employee relation.
Let us illustrate partitioned computations through an example.
Example 1. Consider an Employee relation, see Figure 1. Note
that the notation ti (1 ≤ i ≤ 8) is not an attribute of the
relation; we used this to indicate the ith tuple. In this relation,
the attribute SSN is sensitive, and furthermore, all tuples of
employees for the Dept = “Defense” are sensitive. In such
a case, the Employee relation may be stored as the following
three relations: (i) Employee1 with attributes EId and SSN (see
Figure 2a); (ii) Employee2 with attributes EId, FirstName,
LastName, Office, and Dept, where Dept = “Defense”
(see Figure 2b); and (iii) Employee3 with attributes EId,
FirstName, LastName, Office, and Dept, where Dept <>
“Defense” (see Figure 2c). Since the relations Employee1
and Employee2 (Figures 2a and 2b) contain only sensitive data,
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these two relations are encrypted before outsourcing, while
Employee3 (Figure 2c), which contains only non-sensitive
data, is outsourced in clear-text. We assume that the sensitive
data is strongly encrypted such that the property of ciphertext
indistinguishability is achieved. Thus, the two occurrences of
E152 have two different ciphertexts.
Consider a query q: SELECT FirstName, LastName, Of-
fice, Dept from Employee where FirstName = John. In the
partitioned computation, the query q is partitioned into two
subqueries: qs that executes on Employee2, and qns that
executes on Employee3. qs will retrieve the tuple t4 while qns
will retrieve the tuple t2. qmerge in this example is simply a
union operator. Note that the execution of the query q will
also retrieve the same tuples. However, such a partitioned
computation, if performed naively, leads to inferences about
sensitive data from non-sensitive data. Before discussing in-
ference attacks, we first present the adversarial model.
Adversarial Model. We assume an honest-but-curious (HBC)
adversary [36], which is considered in the standard setting
for security in the public cloud that is not trustworthy. An
HBC adversarial public cloud stores an outsourced dataset
without tampering, correctly computes assigned tasks, and
returns answers; however, it may exploit side knowledge (e.g.,
query execution, background knowledge, and the output size)
to gain as much information as possible about the sensitive
data. Furthermore, the HBC adversary can eavesdrop on the
communication channels between the cloud and the DB owner
and that may help in gaining knowledge about sensitive data,
queries, or results; hence, a secure channel is assumed. In our
setting, the adversary has full access to the following:
All the non-sensitive data. For example, for the Employee
relation in Example 1, an adversary knows the complete
Employee3 relation (refer to Figure 2c).
Auxiliary/background information of the sensitive data. The
auxiliary information [11], [12] may contain metadata, schema
of the relation, and the number of tuples in the relation (note
that having an adversary with the auxiliary information is
also considered in literature). In Example 1, the adversary
knows that there are two sensitive relations, one of them
containing six tuples and the other one containing four tuples,
in the Employee1 and the Employee2 relations; Figures 2a
and 2b. In contrast, the adversary is not aware of the following
information before the query execution: how many people
work in a specific sensitive department, is a specific person
working only in a sensitive department, only in a non-sensitive
department, or both.
Adversarial view. When executing a query, an adversary knows
which encrypted sensitive tuples and cleartext non-sensitive
tuples are sent in response to a query. We refer this as the
adversarial view, denoted by AV : AV = Inc∪Opc, where Inc
refers to the query arrives at the cloud and Opc refers to the
encrypted and non-encrypted tuples, transmitted in response to
Inc. For example, the first row of Table II shows an adversarial
view that shows that Opc = t2 tuples from the non-sensitive
relation and encrypted Opc = t4 tuples from the sensitive
relation are returned to answer the query for Inc = E259.
Some frequent query values. The adversary observes query
predicates on the non-sensitive data, and hence, can deduce the
most frequent query predicates by observing many queries.
Inference Attacks in Partitioned Computations. To see the
inference attack on the sensitive data while jointly processing
sensitive and non-sensitive data, consider following three
queries on the Employee2 and Employee3 relations; refer to
Figures 2b and 2c.
Example 2. (Q1) retrieve tuples of employee E259, (Q2)
retrieve tuples of employee E101, and (Q3) retrieve tuples
of employee E199.2 When answering a query, the adversary
knows the tuple ids of retrieved encrypted tuples and the full
information of the returned non-sensitive tuples. We refer to
this information gain by the adversary as the adversarial view,
see Table II, where E (ti) denotes an encrypted tuple ti.
Query value Returned tuples/Adversarial view
Employee2 Employee3
E259 E (t4 ) t2
E101 E (t1 ) null
E199 null t3
Table II: Queries and returned tuples/adversarial view.
Outputs of the above three queries will reveal enough
information to learn something about sensitive data. In Q1,
the adversary learns that E259 works in both sensitive and
non-sensitive departments, because the answers obtained from
the two relations contribute to the final answer. Moreover, the
adversary may learn which sensitive tuple has an Eid equals
to E259. In Q2, the adversary learns that E101 works only in
a sensitive department, because the query will not return any
answer from the Employee3 relation. In Q3, the adversary
learns that E199 works only in a non-sensitive department.
The Query Binning (QB) Approach. To prevent the inference
attack in a partitioned computation, a new security definition is
needed. Before discussing the formal definition of partitioned
data security (§III), we provide a possible solution to prevent
inference attacks and then intuition for the security definition.
The query binning (QB) strategy stores a non-sensitive
relation, say Rns , in clear-text while it stores a sensitive
relation, say Rs, using a cryptographically secure approach.
QB prevents leakage such as in Example 2 by appropriately
mapping a query for a predicate, say q(w), to corresponding
queries both over the non-sensitive relation, say q(Wns)(Rns),
and encrypted relation, say q(Ws)(Rs), which represent a set
of predicates (or selection queries) that are executed over the
relation Rns in plaintext and over the sensitive relation Rs,
using the underlying cryptographic method, respectively. The
set of predicates in q(Wns)(Rns) (likewise in q(WS)(Rs))
correspond to the non-sensitive (sensitive) bins including
the predicate w, denoted by NSB (SB ). The predicates in
q(Ws)(Rs) are encrypted before transmitting to the cloud.
2We used random Eids, which is common in a real employee relation. In
contrast, in sequential ids, the absence of an id from the non-sensitive relation
directly informs the adversary that the given id exists in the sensitive relation.
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Query value Returned tuples/Adversarial view
Employee2 Employee3
E259 E (t4 ), E (t1 ) t2, t6
E101 E (t4 ), E (t1 ) t3, t8
E199 E (t4 ), E (t1 ) t3, t8
Table III: The adversarial view when following QB.
The bins are selected such that: (i) w ∈ q(Wns)(Rns) ∩
q(Ws)(Rs) to ensure that all the tuples containing the
predicate w are retrieved, and, (ii) joint execution of the
queries q(Wns)(Rns) and q(Ws)(Rs) (hereafter, denoted by
q(W )(Rs, Rns), where W = Ws ∪ Wns ) does not leak
the predicate w. Results from the execution of the queries
q(Wns)(Rns) and q(Ws)(Rs) are decrypted, possibly filtered,
and merged to generate the final answer. Note that bins are
created only once for all the values of a searching attribute
before any query is executed. The details of the bin formation
will be discussed in §IV.
For answering the above-mentioned three queries, QB
creates two bins on sensitive parts: {E101, E259}, {E152,
E159}, and two sets on non-sensitive parts: {E259, E254},
{E199, E152}. Table III illustrates the generated adversarial
view when QB is used to answer queries as shown in Example
2. In this example, row 1 of Table III shows that this instance
of QB maps the query for E259 to 〈E259, E254〉 over
cleartext and to encrypted version of values for 〈E259, E101〉
over sensitive data. Note that simply from the generated
adversarial views, the adversary cannot determine the query
value w (E259 in the example) or find a value that is shared
between the two sets. Thus, while answering a query, the
adversary cannot learn which employee works only in defense,
design, or in both. The reason is that the desired query value,
w, is encrypted with other encrypted values of Ws, and,
furthermore, the query value, w, cannot be distinguished from
many requested non-sensitive values of Wns , which are in
clear-text. Consequently, the adversary is unable to find an
intersection of the two sets, which is the exact value.
III. PARTITIONED DATA SECURITY
This section formalizes the notion of partitioned data
security that establishes when a partitioned computation over
sensitive and non-sensitive data does not leak any sensitive
information. We begin by first formalizing the concepts of:
associated values, associated tuples, and relationship between
counts of sensitive values.
Notations used in the definitions. Let t1, t2, . . . , tm be tuples
of a sensitive relation, say Rs. Thus, the relation Rs stores the
encrypted tuples E(t1), E(t2), . . . , E(tm). Let s1, s2, . . . , sm′
be values of an attribute, say A, that appears in one of the
sensitive tuples of Rs. Note that m′ ≤ m, since several tuples
may have an identical value. Furthermore, si ∈ Domain(A),
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m′, where Domain(A) represents the domain
of values the attribute A can take. By #s(si), we refer to
the number of sensitive tuples that have si as the value for
attribute A. We further define #s(v) = 0,∀v ∈ Domain(A),
v /∈ s1, s2, . . . , sm′ . Let t1, t2, . . . , tn be tuples of a non-
sensitive relation, say Rns . Let ns1,ns2, . . . ,nsn′ be values
of the attribute A that appears in one of the non-sensitive
tuples of Rns . In analogy with the case where the relation is
sensitive, n′ ≤ n, and nsi ∈ Domain(A), i = 1, 2, . . . , n′.
Associated values. Let ei = E(ti)[A] be the encrypted
representation of an attribute value of A in a sensitive tuple of
the relation Rs, and nsj be a value of the attribute A for some
tuple of the relation Rns . We say that ei is associated with
nsj , (denoted by
a
=), if the plaintext value of ei is identical
to the value nsj . In Example 1, the value of the attribute Eid
in tuple t4 (of Employee2, see Figure 2b) is associated with
the value of the attribute Eid in tuple t2 (of Employee3, see
Figure 2c), since both values correspond to E259.
Associated tuples. Let ti be a sensitive tuple of the relation
Rs (i.e., Rs stores encrypted representation of ti) and tj be
a non-sensitive tuple of the relation Rns . We state that ti is
associated with tj (for an attribute, say A) iff the value of the
attribute A in ti is associated with the value of the attribute A
in tj (i.e., ti[A]
a
= tj [A]). Note that this is the same as stating
that the two values of attribute A are equal for both tuples.
Relationship between counts of sensitive values. Let vi and
vj be two distinct values in Domain(A). We denote the
relationship between the counts of sensitive tuples with these
A values (i.e., #s(vi) (or #s(vj))) by vi
r∼ vj . Note that
r∼ can be one of <,=, or > relationships. For instance, in
Example 1, the E101 r∼ E259 corresponds to =, since both
values have exactly one sensitive tuple (see Figure 2b), while
E101
r∼ E199 is >, since there is one sensitive tuple with
value E101 while there is no sensitive tuple with E199.
Given the above definitions, we can now formally state
the security requirement that ensures that simultaneous exe-
cution of queries over sensitive (encrypted) and non-sensitive
(plaintext) data does not leak any information. Before that,
we wish to mention the need of a new security definition in
our context. The inference attack in the partitioned computing
can be considered to be related to the known-plaintext attack
(KPA) wherein the adversary knows some plaintext data which
is hidden in a set of ciphertext. In KPA, the adversary’s goal
is to determine which ciphertext data is related to a given
plaintext, i.e., determining a mapping between ciphertext and
the corresponding plaintext data representing the same value.
In our setup, non-sensitive values are visible to the adversary
in plaintext. However, the attacks are different since, unlike
the case of KPA, in our setup, the ciphertext data might not
contain any data value that is the same as some non-sensitive
data visible to the adversary in plaintext.3
Definition: Partitioned Data Security. Let R be a rela-
tion containing sensitive and non-sensitive tuples. Let Rs
and Rns be the sensitive and non-sensitive relations, respec-
tively. Let AV be an adversarial view generated for a query
3The HBC adversary cannot launch the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA)
and the chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA). Since the sensitive data is non-
deterministically encrypted (by our assumption), it is not prone to the
ciphertext only attack (COA).
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q(w)(Rs, Rns)[A], where the query, q, for a value w in
the attribute A of the Rs and Rns relations. Let X be the
auxiliary information about the sensitive data, and PrAdv be
the probability of the adversary knowing any information.
A query execution mechanism ensures the partitioned data
security if the following two properties hold:
(1) PrAdv [ei
a
= nsj |X] = PrAdv [ei a= nsj |X,AV ], where
ei = E(ti)[A] is the encrypted representation for the attribute
value A for any tuple ti of the relation Rs and nsj is a value
for the attribute A for any tuple of the relation Rns .
(2) PrAdv [vi
r∼ vj |X] = PrAdv [vi r∼ vj |X,AV ], for all
vi, vi ∈ Domain(A).
Equation (1) captures the fact that an initial probability
of associating a sensitive tuple with a non-sensitive tuple
will be identical after executing a query on the relations, i.e.,
an adversary cannot learn anything from an adversarial view
generated after the query execution. Satisfying this condition
also prevents an adversary to have success against KPA.
Equation (2) states that the probability of an adversary gaining
information about the relative frequency of sensitive values
does not increase after the query execution. In Example 2,
an execution of any three queries (for values E101, E199,
or E259) without using QB does not satisfy Equation (1).
For example, the query for E199 retrieves the only tuple
from non-sensitive relation, and that changes the probability
of estimating whether E199 is sensitive or non-sensitive to
0 than an initial probability of the same estimation, which
was 1/4. Hence, an execution of the three queries violates
partitioned data security. However, the query execution for
E259 and E101 satisfies Equation (2), since the count of
returned tuples from Employee2 is equal. Hence, the adversary
cannot distinguish between the count of the values (E259 and
E101) in the domain of Eid of Employee2 relation.
IV. QUERY BINNING TECHNIQUE
We develop our strategy initially under the assumption that
queries are only on a single attribute, say A. QB approach
takes as inputs: (i) the set of data values (of the attribute A)
that are sensitive, along with their counts, and (ii) the set of
data values (of the attribute A) that are non-sensitive, along
with their counts. QB returns partitions of attribute values that
form the query bins for both the sensitive and for the non-
sensitive parts of the query. We begin in §IV-A by developing
the approach for the case when a sensitive tuple is associated
with at most one non-sensitive tuple (Algorithm 1). Finally,
we provide a general strategy to create bins when a sensitive
tuple is associated with several non-sensitive tuples, in §IV-B.
Informally, QB distributes attribute values in a ma-
trix, where rows are sensitive bins, and columns are non-
sensitive bins. For example, suppose there are 16 values, say
0, 1, . . . , 15, and assume all the values have sensitive and
associated non-sensitive tuples. Now, the DB owner arranges
16 values in a 4× 4 matrix, as follows:
NSB0 NSB1 NSB2 NSB3
SB0 11 2 5 14
SB1 10 3 8 7
SB2 0 15 6 4
SB3 13 1 12 9
Here, we have four sensitive bins: SB0 {11,2,5,14}, SB1
{10,3,8,7}, SB2 {0,15,6,4}, SB3 {13,1,12,9}, and four non-
sensitive bins: NSB0 {11,10,0,13}, NSB1 {2,3,15,1}, NSB2
{5,8,6,12}, NSB3 {14,7,4,9}. When a query arrives for a value
1, the DB owner searches for tuples containing values 2,3,15,1
(viz. NSB1) on the non-sensitive data and values in SB3
(viz., 13,1,12,9) on the sensitive data using a cryptographic
mechanism integrated into QB. We will show that in the
proposed approach, while the adversary learns that a query
corresponds to one of the four values in NSB1, since query
values in SB3 are encrypted, the adversary does not learn the
actual sensitive value or the actual non-sensitive value that is
identical to a clear-text sensitive value.
A. The Base Case
QB consists of two steps. First, query bins are created
(information about which will reside at the DB owner) using
which queries will be rewritten. The second step consists
of rewriting the query based on the binning. Here, QB is
explained for the base case, where a sensitive tuple, ts, is asso-
ciated with at most a single non-sensitive tuple, tns , and vice
versa (i.e., a= is a 1:1 relationship). Thus, if the value has two
tuples, then one of them must be sensitive and the other one
must be non-sensitive, but both the tuples cannot be sensitive
or non-sensitive. A value can also have only one tuple, either
sensitive or non-sensitive. Note that t1, t2, . . . , tl are sensitive
tuples, with values of an attribute A being s1, s2, . . . sn, si 6=
sj if i 6= j. Thus, in the remainder of the section, we will refer
to association between encrypted value E(ti)[A] and a non-
sensitive value nsj simply as an association between values si
and nsj , where si is the cleartext representation of E(ti)[A]
and nsj is a value in the attribute A of a non-sensitive relation;
i.e., si
a
= nsj represents E(ti)[A]
a
= nsj .
The scenario in Example 1 satisfies the base case. The
EId attribute values corresponding to sensitive tuples in-
clude 〈E101, E259,E152,E159〉 and corresponding to non-
sensitive tuples are 〈E199, E259, E254, E152〉 for which a=
is 1:1. We discuss QB under the above assumption, but relax
the assumption in §IV-B. Before describing QB, we first define
the concept of approximately square factors of a number.
Approximately square factors. We say two numbers, say x
and y, are approximately square factors of a number, say n >
0, if x × y = n, and x and y are equal or close to each
other such that the difference between x and y is less than the
difference between any two factors, say x′ and y′, of n such
that x′ × y′ = n.
Step 1: Bin-creation. QB, described in Algorithm 1, finds
two approximately square factors of |NS |, say x and y, where
x ≥ y. QB creates SB = x sensitive bins, where each sensitive
bin contains at most y values. Thus, we assume |S| ≥ x. QB,
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Algorithm 1: Bin-creation algorithm, the base case.
Inputs: |NS |: the number of values in the non-sensitive
data,
|S|: the number of values in the sensitive data.
Outputs: SB : sensitive bins; NSB : non-sensitive bins
1 Function create bins(S ,NS ) begin
2 Permute all sensitive values
3 x, y ← approx sq factors(|NS |): x ≥ y
4 |NSB | ← x, NSB ← d|NS |/xe, SB ← x, |SB | ← y
5 for i ∈ (1, |S|) do SB [i modulo x][∗]← S[i];
6 for (i, j) ∈ (0,SB − 1), (0, |SB | − 1) do
NSB [j][i]← allocateNS (SB [i ][j ]) ;
7 for i ∈ (0,NSB − 1) do NSB [i][∗]← fill the bin if
empty with the size limit to x ;
8 return SB and NSB
9 Function allocateNS (SB [i ][j ]) begin
find a non-sensitive value associated with the jth
sensitive value of the ith sensitive bin
further, creates NSB = d|NS|/xe non-sensitive bins, where
each non-sensitive bin contains at most |NSB | = x values.
Note that we are assuming that |S| ≤ |NS |. (QB can also
handle the case of |S| > |NS | by applying Algorithm 1 in a
reverse way, i.e., factorizing |S|.)
Assignment of sensitive values. We number the sensitive bins
from 0 to x−1 and the values therein from 0 to y−1. To assign
a value to sensitive bins, QB first permutes the set of sensitive
values. This permutation is kept secret from the adversary by
the DB owner.4 To assign sensitive values to sensitive bins, QB
takes the ith sensitive value and assigns it to the (i modulo
x)th sensitive bin (see Lines 2 and 5 of Algorithm 1).
Assignment of non-sensitive values. We number the non-
sensitive bins from 0 to d|NS |e/x−1 and values therein from
0 to x−1. To assign non-sensitive values, QB takes a sensitive
bin, say j, and its ith sensitive value. Assign the non-sensitive
value associated with the ith sensitive value to the jth position
of the ith non-sensitive bin. Here, if each value of a sensitive
bin has an associated non-sensitive value and |S| = |NS |,
then QB has assigned all the non-sensitive values to their bins
(Line 6 of Algorithm 1). Note that it may be the case that
only a few sensitive values have their associated non-sensitive
values and |S| ≤ |NS |. In this case, we assign the sensitive and
their associated non-sensitive values to bins like we did in the
previous case. However, we need to assign the non-sensitive
values that are not associated with a sensitive value, by filling
all the non-sensitive bins to size x (Line 7 of Algorithm 1).
Aside. Note that QB assigned at least as many values in a non-
sensitive bin as it assigned to a sensitive bin. QB may form the
non-sensitive and sensitive bins in such a way that the number
of values in sensitive bins is higher than the non-sensitive bins.
4The DB owner permutes sensitive values to prevent the adversary to create
bins at her end; e.g., if the adversary knows that employee ids are ordered,
she can also create bins by knowing the number of resultant tuples to a query.
For simplicity, we do not show permuted sensitive values in any figure.
Algorithm 2: Bin-retrieval algorithm.
Inputs: w: the query value. Outputs: SBa and NSBb:
one sensitive bin and one non-sensitive bin to be
retrieved for answering w.
Variables: found ← false
1 Function retrieve bins(q(w)) begin
2 for (i, j) ∈ (0,SB − 1), (0, |SB | − 1) do
if w = SB i[j] then
3 return SB i and NSB j ; found ← true;
break
4 if found 6= true then
5 for (i, j) ∈ (0,NSB − 1), (0, |NSB | − 1) do
6 if w = NSB i[j] then
return NSB i and SB j ; break
7 Retrieve the desired tuples from the cloud by sending
encrypted values of the bin SB i (or SB j) and
clear-text values of the bin NSB j (or NSB i) to the
cloud
We chose sensitive bins to be smaller since the processing time
on encrypted data is expected to be higher than clear-text data
processing; hence, by searching and retrieving fewer sensitive
tuples, we decrease the encrypted data-processing time.
Step 2: Bin-retrieval – answering queries. Algorithm 2
presents the pseudocode for the bin-retrieval algorithm. The
algorithm, first, checks the existence of a query value in
sensitive bins and/or non-sensitive bins (see Lines 2 and 4
of Algorithm 2). If the value exists in a sensitive bin and a
non-sensitive bin, the DB owner retrieves the corresponding
two bins (see Line 7). Note that here the adversarial view is not
enough to leak the query value or to find a value that is shared
between the two bins. The reason is that the desired query
value is encrypted with a set of other encrypted values and,
furthermore, the query value is obscured in many requested
non-sensitive values, which are in clear-text. Consequently,
the adversary is unable to find an intersection of the two bins,
which is the exact value.
There are the following three other cases to consider: (i)
Some sensitive values of a bin are not associated with any
non-sensitive value. For example, in Figure 3, the sensitive
values s4, s7, s8, s9, and s10 are not associated with any non-
sensitive value. (ii) A sensitive bin does not hold any value
that is associated with any non-sensitive value. For example,
the sensitive bin SB4 in Figure 3 satisfies this clause. (iii) A
non-sensitive bin containing no value that is associated with
any sensitive value.
In all three cases, if the DB owner retrieves only either a
sensitive or non-sensitive bin containing the value, it leads to
information leakage similar to Example 2 (or incomplete an-
swers). In order to prevent such leakage, Algorithm 2 follows
two rules stated below (see Lines 3 and 6 of Algorithm 2):
Tuple retrieval rule R1. If the query value w is a sensitive
value that is at the jth position of the ith sensitive bin (i.e.,
w = SB i[j]), then the DB owner will fetch the ith sensitive
and the jth non-sensitive bins (see Line 3 of Algorithm 2). By
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Line 2 of Algorithm 2, the DB owner knows that the value w
is either sensitive or non-sensitive.
Tuple retrieval rule R2. If the query value w is a non-sensitive
value that is at the jth position of the ith non-sensitive bin,
then the DB owner will fetch the ith non-sensitive and the jth
sensitive bins (see Line 6 of Algorithm 2).
Note that if query value w is in both sensitive and non-
sensitive bins, then both the rules are applicable, and they
retrieve exactly the same bins. In addition, if the value w is
neither in a sensitive or a non-sensitive bin, then there is no
need to retrieve any bin.
Aside. After knowing the bins, the DB owner sends all the
sensitive values in the encrypted form and the non-sensitive
values in clear-text to the cloud. The tuple retrieval based on
the encrypted values reveals only the tuple addresses that sat-
isfy the requested values. We can also hide the access-patterns
by using PIR, ORAM, or DSSE on each required sensitive
value. As mentioned in §I, access-pattern-hiding techniques
are prone to size and workload-skew attacks. Nonetheless,
the use of QB with access-pattern-hiding techniques makes
them secure against these attacks, which is discussed in detail
in the full version. QB is designed as a general mechanism
that provides partitioned data security when coupled with any
cryptographic technique. For special cryptographic techniques
that hide access-patterns, it may be possible to design a
different mechanism that may provide partitioned data security.
Associated bins. We say a sensitive bin is associated with a
non-sensitive bin, if the two bins are retrieved for answering
at least one query.
Our aim when answering queries for all the sensitive and
non-sensitive values using Algorithm 2 is to associate each
sensitive bin with each non-sensitive bin; resulting in the
adversary being unable to predict which (if any) is the value
shared between two bins.
Example 3: QB example Step 1: Bin Creation. We show
the bin-creation algorithm for 10 sensitive values and 10 non-
sensitive values. We assume that only five sensitive values,
say s1, s2, s3, s5, s6, have their associated non-sensitive val-
ues, say ns1,ns2,ns3,ns5,ns6, and the remaining 5 sensi-
tive (say, s4, s7, s8, . . . s10) and 5 non-sensitive values (say,
ns11,ns12, . . . ,ns15) are not associated. For simplicity, we
use different indexes for non-associated values.
QB creates 2 non-sensitive bins and 5 sensitive bins,
and divides 10 sensitive values over the following 5 sen-
sitive bins: SB0 {s5, s10}, SB1 {s1, s6}, SB2 {s2, s7},
SB3 {s3, s8}, SB4 {s4, s9}; see Figure 3. Now, QB dis-
tributes non-sensitive values associated with the sensitive
values over two non-sensitive bins, resulting in the bin NSB0
{ns5,ns1,ns2,ns3, ∗} and NSB1 {∗,ns6, ∗, ∗, ∗}, where a ∗
shows an empty position in the bin. In the sequel, QB needs to
fill the non-sensitive bins with the remaining 5 non-sensitive
values; hence, ns11 is assigned to the last position of the
bin NSB0, and the bin NSB1 contains the remaining 4 non-
sensitive values such as {ns12,ns6,ns13,ns14,ns15}.
Example 3: QB example (continued) Step 2: Bin-retrieval.
Sensitive bins Non-sensitive bins
s1, s6
s2, s7
s3, s8
ns12, ns6, ns13, ns14, ns15
ns5, ns1, ns2, ns3, ns11
s4, s9
s5, s10
SB1
SB2
SB3
SB4
SB0
NSB0
NSB1
Figure 3: QB for 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values.
We show how to retrieve tuples. If a query is for the sensitive
value s2 (see Figure 3), then the DB owner fetches two bins
SB2 and NSB0. If a query is for the non-sensitive value ns13
or sensitive value s7, then the DB owner fetches two bins
SB2 and NSB1. Thus, it is impossible for the adversary to
find (by observing the adversarial view) which is an exact
query value from the non-sensitive bin and which is the
sensitive value associated with one of the non-sensitive values.
This fact is also clear from Table IV, which shows that the
adversarial view is not enough to leak information from the
joint processing of sensitive and non-sensitive data, unlike
Example 2. In Table IV, E(si) shows the encrypted value of
si, and we are showing the adversarial view only for queries
for s2, s7, and ns13, due to space restriction. In this example,
note that the bin SB2 gets associated with both the non-
sensitive bins NSB0 and NSB1, due to following Algorithm 2.
Exact query value Returned tuples/Adversarial view
Sensitive bin and data Non-sensitive bin and data
s2 or ns2 SB2:E(s2 ),E(s7 ) NSB0:ns1,ns2,ns3,ns5,ns11
s7 SB2:E(s2 ),E(s7 ) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
ns13 SB2:E(s2 ),E(s7 ) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
Table IV: Queries and returned tuples/adversarial view after
retrieving tuples according to Algorithm 2.
Algorithm Correctness. We will prove that QB does not lead
to information leakage through the joint processing of sensitive
and non-sensitive data. To prove correctness, we first define
the concept of surviving matches. Informally, we show that
QB maintains surviving matches among all sensitive and non-
sensitive values, resulting in all sensitive bins being associated
with all non-sensitive bins. Thus, an initial condition: a sensi-
tive value is assumed to have an identical value to one of the
non-sensitive value is preserved.
Surviving matches. We define surviving matches, which are
classified as either surviving matches of values or surviving
matches of bins, as follows:
Before query execution. Before retrieving any tuple, having an
assumption that only the DB owner can decrypt an encrypted
sensitive value, E(si), the adversary cannot learn which non-
sensitive value is associated with the value si. Thus, the
adversary will consider that E(si) is associated with one of
the non-sensitive values. Based on this fact, the adversary can
create a complete bipartite graph having |S| nodes on one side
and |NS | nodes on the other side. The edges in the graph are
called surviving matches of the values. For example, before
executing any query, the adversary can create a bipartite graph
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Sensitive
bins
Non-sensitive 
bins
SB0
SB1
SB2
SB3
SB4
NSB0
NSB1
(a) Surviving matches after the
tuple retrieval following Algo-
rithm 2.
Sensitive
bins
Non-sensitive 
bins
SB0
SB1
SB2
SB3
SB4
NSB0
NSB1
(b) Surviving matches without fol-
lowing Algorithm 2 for ns12, ns13,
ns14, ns15; also see Table IV.
Figure 4: An example to show security of QB using surviving
matches for 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values.
for 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values.
After query execution. Recall that the query execution on the
datasets creates an adversarial view that guides the adversary
to create a (new) bipartite graph containing SB nodes on one
side and NSB nodes on the other side. The edges in the new
graph (obtained after the query execution) are called surviving
matches of the bins. E.g., after executing queries according to
Algorithm 2, an adversary can create a bipartite graph having
5 nodes on one side and 2 nodes on another side (Figure 4a).
Note that since bins contain values, the surviving matches of
the bins can lead to the surviving matches of the values. Hence,
from Figure 4a, the adversary can also create a bipartite graph
for 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values.
We show that a technique for retrieving tuples that drops
some surviving matches of the bins leading to drop of the
surviving matches of the values is not secure, and hence,
results in the information leakage through non-sensitive data.
Example 4: Dropping surviving matches. In Figure 3, for
answering queries for associated values s1, s2, s3, s5, s6, ns1,
ns2, ns3, ns5, or ns6, the DB owner must follow Line 3 or 6 of
Algorithm 2 for retrieving the two bins holding corresponding
sensitive and non-sensitive data; otherwise, she cannot retrieve
two bins that share a common value. However, for answering
values s4, s7, s8, s9, s10, ns6, ns12, ns13, ns14, or ns15 (recall
that these values are not associated), if the DB owner does not
follow Algorithm 2 and retrieves the bin containing the desired
value with any randomly selected bin of the other side, then
it could result in the following adversarial view; see Table V.
(We show the case when NSB1 is only associated with bin
SB1, and bins SB2 is only associated with bin NSB0, since
Algorithm 2 is not followed.)
Having such an adversarial view (Table V), the adversary
can learn the following fact that: (i) Encrypted sensitive tuples
of the bin SB2 have associated non-sensitive tuples only in the
bin NSB0, not in NSB1 (Figure 4b). (ii) Non-sensitive tuples
of the bin NSB1 have their associated sensitive tuples only in
the bin SB1 (see Figure 4b). Based on this adversarial view
(Table V), the bipartite graph drops some surviving matches
of the bins (see Figure 4b). However, note that in Table IV,
bin SB2 was associated with both non-sensitive bins. Hence,
a random retrieval of bins is not secure to prevent information
leakage through non-sensitive data accessing.
However, if the DB owner uses Line 3 or 6 of Algo-
rithm 2 for retrieving values that are not associated, the above-
Exact query value Returned tuples/Adversarial view
Sensitive bin and data Non-sensitive bin and data
s2 or ns2 SB2:E(s2 ),E(s7 ) NSB0:ns1,ns2,ns3,ns5,ns11
s6 or ns6 SB1:E(s1 ),E(s6 ) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
s7 SB2:E(s2),E(s7) NSB0:ns1,ns2,ns3,ns5,ns11
ns12 SB1:E(s1),E(s6) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
ns13 SB1:E(s1),E(s6) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
ns14 SB1:E(s1),E(s6) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
ns15 SB1:E(s1),E(s6) NSB1:ns6,ns12,ns13,ns14,ns15
Table V: Queries and returned tuples/adversarial view without
following Algorithm 2.
mentioned facts no longer hold. Figure 4a shows each sensitive
bin is associated with each non-sensitive bin, if Algorithm 2
is followed. Thus, all the surviving matches of the bins and
values are preserved after answering queries. Hence, for the
example of 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values, QB
(Algorithms 1 and 2) is secure, so the adversary cannot find an
exact association between sensitive and non-sensitive values.
Informal security proof sketch (see [34] for a detailed
proof). Let v1, v2, v3, and v4 be values containing only one
sensitive and one non-sensitive tuple. Let E1, E2, E3, and E4
be encrypted representations of these values in an arbitrary
order, i.e., it is not mandatory that E1 be the encrypted
representation of v1. In this example, the cloud stores an
encrypted relation, say Rs, containing four encrypted tuples
with encrypted representations E1, E2, E3, E4 and a clear-text
relation, say Rns , containing four clear-text tuples with values
v1, v2, v3, v4. The objective of the adversary is to deduce
a clear-text value corresponding to an encrypted value. Note
that before executing a query, the probability of an encrypted
value, say Ei, to have the clear-text value, say vi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4
is 1/4, which QB maintains at the end of a query. Assume
that the user wishes to retrieve the tuple containing v1. By
following QB, the user asks a query, say q(E1, E3)(Rs),
on the encrypted relation Rs for E1, E3, and a query, say
q(v1, v2)(Rns), on the clear-text relation Rns for v1, v2. Here,
we need that the probability of finding the clear-text value
of an encrypted representation, say Ei, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, remains
identical before and after a query to satisfy the first condition
of the partitioned data security. In short, the retrieval of the
four tuples containing one of the following: 〈E1, E3, v1, v2〉,
results in 16 possible allocations of the values v1, v2, v3,
and v4 to E1, E2, E3, and E4, of which only four possible
allocations have v1 as the clear-text representation of E1. This
results in the probability of finding E1 = v1 is 1/4. A similar
argument also holds for other encrypted values. Hence, an
initial probability of associating a sensitive value with a non-
sensitive value remains identical to after executing a query.
A Simple Extension of the Base Case. Algorithm 1 creates
bins when the number of non-sensitive data values is not
a prime number, by finding the two approximately square
factors. However, Algorithm 1 may exhibit a relatively higher
cost (i.e., the number of the retrieved tuple) when the sum
of the approximately square factors is high. For example, if
there are 41 sensitive data values and 82 non-sensitive data
values, then Algorithm 1 creates 2 non-sensitive bins having 41
values in each and 41 sensitive bins having exactly one value
in each. We handle the case when the number of non-sensitive
9 ICDE, 2019.
values is close to a square number. We find the cost using
Algorithm 1; in addition, we find a square number closest to
the non-sensitive values (here 81 is the closest square number
to 82) and the cost. Then, we use Algorithm 1 that creates
bins using a method that results in fewer retrieved tuples. In
this example, we create 9 non-sensitive and 9 sensitive bins.
B. General Case: Multiple Values with Multiple Tuples
This section generalizes Algorithm 1 to consider a case
when different data values have different numbers of asso-
ciated tuples. First, we will show that sensitive values with
different numbers of tuples may provide enough information
to the adversary leading to the size, frequency-count attacks,
and may disclose some information about the sensitive data.
Hence, in the case of multiple values with multiple tuples, Al-
gorithm 1 cannot be directly implemented. We, thus, develop
a strategy to overcome such a situation.
Size attack scenario in the base QB. Consider an assignment
of 10 sensitive and 10 non-sensitive values to bins using
Algorithm 1; see Figure 3. Assume that a sensitive value, say
s1, has 1000 sensitive tuples and an associated non-sensitive
value, say ns1, has 2000 tuples, while all the other values
have only one tuple each. Further, assume that each data
value represents the salary of employees. In this example,
consider a query execution for a value, say ns1. The DB owner
retrieves tuples from two bins: SB1 (containing encrypted
tuples of values s1 and s6) and NSB0 (containing tuples of
values ns1,ns2,ns3,ns5,ns11); see Figure 3. The number of
retrieved tuples satisfying the values of the bins SB1 and
NSB0 will be highest (i.e., 3005) than the number of tuples
retrieved based on any two other bins. Thus, the retrieval of
the two bins SB1 and NSB0 provides enough information
to the adversary to determine which one is the sensitive bin
associated with the bin holding the value ns1. Moreover, after
observing many queries and having background knowledge,
the adversary may estimate that 1000 people in the sensitive
relation earn a salary equal to the value ns1.
Thus, in the case of different sensitive values having differ-
ent numbers of tuples, Algorithm 1 cannot satisfy the second
condition of partitioned data security (i.e., the adversary is
able to distinguish two sensitive values based on the number
of retrieved tuples, which was not possible before the query
execution, and concludes that a sensitive value (s1 in the
above example) has more tuples than any other sensitive value)
though preserving all surviving matches.
In order for the second condition of partitioned data
security to hold (and for the scheme to be resilient to the size
and frequency-count attacks, as illustrated above), sensitive
bins need to hold identical numbers of tuples. A trivial way
of doing this is to outsource some encrypted fake tuples such
that the number of tuples in each sensitive bin will be identical.
However, we need to be careful; otherwise, adding fake tuples
in each sensitive bin may increase the cost, if all the heavy-
hitter sensitive values are allocated to a single bin. This fact
will be clear in the following example.
Example 5: (Illustrating ways to assign sensitive values
s4, s5, s6
s7, s8, s9
SB0
SB1
SB2
s1, s2, s3
(a) The first way.
s9, s4, s2
s8, s6, s1
s7, s5, s3
SB0
SB1
SB2
(b) The second way.
Figure 5: An assignment of 9 sensitive values to 3 bins.
to bins to minimize the addition of fake tuples). Consider
9 sensitive values, say s1, s2, . . . , s9, having 10, 20, 30, 40,
50, 60, 70, 80, and 90 tuples, respectively (we assume that
there are 9 non-sensitive values, and computed that we need
3 sensitive and 3 non-sensitive bins). There are multiple ways
of assigning these values to three bins so that we need to
add a minimum number of fake tuples to each bin. Figure 5
shows two different ways to assign these values to bins.
Figure 5b shows the best way – to minimize the addition of
fake encrypted tuples; hence minimizing the cost. However,
bins in Figure 5a require us to add 180 and 90 fake encrypted
tuples to the bins SB0 and SB1, respectively.
There is no need to add any fake tuple if the non-sensitive
values have identical numbers of tuples, because an adversary
cannot deduce which sensitive bin contains sensitive tuples
associated with a non-sensitive value. However, it is obvious
that fake non-sensitive tuples cannot be added in clear-text.
Adding fake encrypted tuples. As an assumption, we know
the number of sensitive bins, say SB , using Algorithm 1. Our
objective is to assign sensitive values to bins such that each
bin holds identical numbers of tuples while minimizing the
number of fake tuples in each bin. To do this, the strategy is
as follows: (i) Sort all the values in a decreasing order of the
number of tuples. (ii) Select SB largest values and allocate
one in each bin. (iii) Select the next value and find a bin that
is containing the fewest number of tuples. If the bin is holding
less than y values, then add the value to the bin; otherwise,
select another bin with the fewest number of tuples. Repeat
this step, for allocating all the values to sensitive bins. (iv)
Add fake tuples’ values to the bins so that each bin contains
identical numbers of tuples. (v) Allocate non-sensitive values
as per Algorithm 1 (Lines 6 and 7).
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF QB
This section explores how effective is QB in scaling ex-
pensive cryptographic techniques by eliminating the necessity
of encrypted data processing over non-sensitive data. Note
that while QB prevents expensive cryptographic operations, it,
nonetheless, comes with an overhead of additional search as
well as communication costs. Thus, a natural question is when
the tradeoff offered by QB improves performance. We note
that if a cryptographic mechanism is extremely inexpensive,
e.g., deterministic, order-preserving encryptions, or index-
based mechanisms [9], [10], the overhead of QB would not
justify the reduced encrypted data processing. But QB has not
been designed for such techniques. Instead, our goal for QB is
to couple it with techniques such as homomorphic encryptions,
DPF [6], or secret-sharing [5] that offer strong security but do
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not scale. Below we develop an analytical model to compare
performance of cryptographic mechanisms with/without QB.
We then conduct an experimental validation of the model and
study QB under different choices of parameters.
A. Performance Modeling of QB
For our model, we will need the following notations: (i)
Ccom : Communication cost of moving one tuple over the
network. (ii) Cp (or Ce): Processing cost of a single selection
query on plaintext (or encrypted data). In addition, we define
three parameters: (i) α: is the ratio between the sizes of the
sensitive data (denoted by S) and the entire dataset (denoted
by S+NS , where NS is non-sensitive data). (ii) β: is the ratio
between the predicate search time on encrypted data using a
cryptographic technique and on clear-text data. The parameter
β captures the overhead of a cryptographic technique. Note
that β = Ce/Cp. (iii) γ: is the ratio between the processing
time of a single selection query on encrypted data and the time
to transmit the single tuple over the network from the cloud
to the DB owner. Note that γ = Ce/Ccom .
Based on the above parameters, we can compute the cost
of cryptographic and non-cryptographic selection operations as
follows: (i) Costplain(x,D): is the sum the processing cost of
x selection queries on plaintext data and the communication
cost of moving all the tuples having x predicates from the
cloud to the DB owner, i.e., x(log(D)Pp + ρDCcom). (ii)
Costcrypt(x,D): is the sum the processing cost of x selection
queries on encrypted data and the communication cost of
moving all the tuples having x predicates from the cloud to the
DB owner, i.e., PeD+ρxDCcom , where ρ is the selectivity of
the query. Note that cost of evaluating x queries over encrypted
data using techniques such as [2], [5], [6], is amortized and can
be performed using a single scan of data. Hence, x is not the
factor in the cost corresponding to encrypted data processing.
Given the above, we define a parameter η that is the ratio
between the computation and communication cost of searching
using QB and the computation and communication cost of
searching when the entire data (viz. sensitive and non-sensitive
data) is fully encrypted using the cryptographic mechanism.
η =
Costcrypt (|SB|, S)
Costcrypt (1, D)
+
Costplain(|NSB|,NS)
Costcrypt (1, D)
Filling out the values from above, the ratio is:
η =
CeS + |SB|ρDCcom
CeD + ρDCcom
+
|NSB| log(D)Cp + |NSB|ρDCcom
CeD + ρDCcom
Separating out the communication and processing costs,
η =
S
D
Ce
Ce + ρCcom
+
|NSB| log(D)Cp
CeD + ρDCcom
+
ρDCcom(|NSB|+ |SB|)
CeD + ρDCcom
Substituting for various terms and cancelling common terms:
η = α
1
(1 + ργ )
+
log(D)
D
|NSB|
β(1 + ργ )
+
ρ
γ
|NSB|+ |SB|
(1 + ργ )
Note that ρ/γ is very small, thus the term (1 + ρ/γ) can
be substituted by 1. Given the above, the equation becomes:
η = α + log(D)|NSB/Dβ + ρ(|NSB | + |SB |)/γ. Note that
the term log(D)|NSB |/Dβ is very small since |NSB | is the
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Figure 6: Experiments.
number of distinct values (approx. equal to
√|NS |) in a non-
sensitive bin, while D, which is the size of a database, is a
large number, and β value is also very large. Thus, the equation
becomes: η = α+ ρ(|SB |+ |NSB |)/γ.
QB is better than a cryptographic approach when η < 1,
i.e., α+ρ(|SB |+|NSB |)/γ < 1. Thus, α < 1− ρ(|SB|+|NSB|)γ .
Note that the values of |SB | and |NSB | are ≈ √|NS |, we
can simplify the above equation to: α < 1 − 2ρ√|NS |/γ. If
we estimate ρ to be roughly 1/|NS | (i.e., we assume uniform
distribution), the above equation becomes: α < 1−2/γ√|NS |.
The equation above demonstrates that QB trades increased
communication costs to reduce the amount of data that needs
to be searched in encrypted form. Note that the reduction
in encryption cost is proportional to α times the size of the
database, while the increase in communication costs is propor-
tional to
√|D|, where |D| is the number of distinct attribute
values. This, coupled with the fact that γ is much higher
than 1 for encryption mechanisms that offer strong security
guarantees, ensures that QB almost always outperforms the full
encryption approaches. For instance, the cryptographic cost for
search using secret-sharing is ≈ 10ms [5], while the cost of
transmitting a single row (≈ 200 bytes for TPCH Customer
table) is ≈ 4 µs making the value of γ ≈ 25000. Thus, QB,
based on the model, should outperform the fully encrypted
solution for almost any value of α, under ideal situations where
our assumption of uniformity holds. Figure 6a plots a graph
of η as a function of γ, for varying sensitivity and ρ = 10%.
B. Experimental Validation
We determined η values for two commercial databases that
support non-deterministic encryption. We refer to them as
systems A and B, respectively, to hide their identities.
Search Techniques. To support encrypted search on both
systems, since they do not provide a searching facility on
the non-deterministically encrypted data, we implemented the
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Technique 1% 5% 20% 40% 60%
SGX-based Opaque [16] 11 15 26 42 59
MPC-based Jana [37] 22 80 270 505 749
Table VI: Time (in seconds) when mixing QB with Opaque
and Jana at different levels of sensitivity.
following technique: retrieves the searching attribute of a
sensitive relation at the DB owner side, decrypts the attributes,
and searches for records that match |SB |. It then retrieves
full tuples corresponding to |SB | predicates’ addresses. For
comparing against cryptographic searches at the cloud-side,
we used SGX-based Opaque [16] and the multi-party computa-
tions (MPC) based Jana [37] for evaluating QB’s effectiveness.
Experimental setup. We used a virtual machine of 2.6 GHz,
4 core processor, 16 GB RAM, 1TB disk, and average 30Mbps
download speed. We used TPCH benchmark to generate the
dataset. The DB owner stores sensitive and non-sensitive bins,
whose size was propositional to the domain size of the search-
able attributes and independent of the database size. For TPC-
H LINEITEM table, metadata for attributes L PARTKEY and
L SUPPKEY were 13.6MB and 0.65MB, respectively.
Exp 1: Robustness of QB. To explore the effectiveness of
QB under different DB sizes, we tested QB for 3 DB sizes:
150K, 1.5M, and 4.5M tuples using No-Ind(A) and No-Ind(B)
as underlying cryptographic mechanisms. Figure 6b plots η
values for the three sizes for No-Ind(A) while varying α.
The figure shows that η < 1, irrespective of the DB sizes,
confirming that QB scales to larger DB sizes (results over No-
Ind(B) are similar). Table VI shows the time taken when using
QB with Opaque and Jana at different levels of sensitivity.
Without using QB for answering a simple selection query,
Opaque [16] took 89 seconds on a dataset of size 700MB
(6M tuples) and Jana [37] took 1051 seconds on a dataset
of size 116MB (1M tuples). Note that the time to execute
the same query on cleartext data of size 700MB took only
0.0002 seconds. QB improves not only the performance of
Opaque and Jana, but also makes them to work securely
on partitioned data and resilient to output-size attack. The
performance of QB will be even higher when one uses more
secure cryptographic techniques that are resilient to output-
size attacks, since these techniques will consume significant
time for answering a query.
Exp 2: Effect of bin size. Figure 6c plots an average time for a
selection query using QB with a different bin size, which is in
turn governed by the values of |SB | and |NSB |, respectively.
We plot the effect of ||SB | − |NSB || on retrieval time and
find that the minimum time is achieved when |SB | = |NSB |.
Thus, the optimal choice is |SB | = |SB | =√|NS |.
VI. DESIDERATA
Below we focus on an aspect of QB, which is to a degree
surprising. While QB is designed for scaling cryptographic
techniques, it has a side-effect of improving security properties
of an underlying cryptographic technique. In particular, a cryp-
tographic technique that is prone to output-size, frequency-
count, and workload-skew attacks becomes secure against
these attacks when mixed with QB. Thus, QB offers a higher
level of security, in addition to saving the cryptographic search
on non-sensitive data.
Enhancing security-levels of indexable techniques. We show
how QB can be integrated with an indexable cryptographic
technique, namely Arx [9] that uses a non-deterministic en-
cryption mechanism. In Arx, the DB owner stores each domain
value v and the frequency of v in the database. The technique
encrypts the ith occurrence of v as a concatenated string
〈v, i〉 thereby ensuring that no two occurrences of v result
in an identical ciphertext. Such a ciphertext representation can
then be indexed on the cloud-side. During retrieval, the user
keeps track of the histogram of occurrences for each value
and generates appropriate ciphertexts that can be used to query
the index on the cloud. It is not difficult to see that Arx, by
itself, is susceptible to the size, frequency-count, workload-
skew, and access-pattern attacks. The query processing using
Arx as efficient as cleartext version due to using an index, e.g.,
β values for Arx are 1.4 on system A and 2.5 on system B.
The use of QB with Arx makes it secure against output-
size, frequency-count, and workload-skew attacks. Of course,
QB takes more time as compared to Arx, since the time of |SB |
searches cannot be absorbed in a single index scan unless all
|SB | values lie in a single node of the index. In the worst case,
we traverse the index at most |SB | times, unlike Arx, which
traverses the index only once for a single selection query.
It, however, significantly enhances the security of Arx by
preventing output size, frequency count, and workload-skew
attacks. However, QB does not protect access-patterns being
revealed which could be prevented using ORAM. Determining
whether coupling ORAM with Arx mixed with QB or using a
more secure cryptographic solution, e.g., secret-sharing, which
uses a linear scan to prevent access-patterns, with QB, more
efficient (while QB with both the solutions strengthen the
underlying cryptographic technique) is an open question.
VII. CONCLUSION
We propose query binning (QB) technique that serves as a
meta approach on top of existing cryptographic techniques to
support secure selection queries when a relation is partitioned
into cryptographically secure sensitive and clear-text non-
sensitive sub-relations. Further, we develop a new notion
of partitioned data security that restricts exposing sensitive
information due to the joint processing of the sensitive and
non-sensitive relations. Besides improving efficiency, while
supporting partitioned security, interestingly, QB enhances
the security of the underlying cryptographic technique by
preventing size, frequency-count, and workload-skew attacks.
Thus, combining QB with efficient but non-secure cloud-side
indexable cryptographic approaches result in an efficient and
significantly more secure search. Furthermore, existing access-
pattern-hiding cryptographic techniques also benefit from the
added security that QB offers.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Gentry, A fully homomorphic encryption scheme. PhD thesis, 2009.
[2] D. X. Song et al., “Practical techniques for searches on encrypted data,”
in IEEE SP, pp. 44–55, 2000.
12 ICDE, 2019.
[3] O. Goldreich, “Towards a theory of software protection and simulation
by oblivious rams,” in STOC, pp. 182–194, 1987.
[4] A. Shamir, “How to share a secret,” Commun. ACM, vol. 22, no. 11,
pp. 612–613, 1979.
[5] F. Emekc¸i et al., “Dividing secrets to secure data outsourcing,” Inf. Sci.,
vol. 263, pp. 198–210, 2014.
[6] N. Gilboa et al., “Distributed point functions and their applications,” in
EUROCRYPT, pp. 640–658, 2014.
[7] E. Boyle et al., “Function secret sharing,” in EUROCRYPT, 2015.
[8] R. A. Popa et al., “CryptDB: processing queries on an encrypted
database,” Commun. ACM, vol. 55, no. 9, pp. 103–111, 2012.
[9] R. Poddar et al., “Arx: A strongly encrypted database system,” IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive, 2016.
[10] E. Shmueli et al., “Designing secure indexes for encrypted databases,”
in DBSec, pp. 54–68, 2005.
[11] M. Naveed et al., “Inference attacks on property-preserving encrypted
databases,” in SIGSAC, pp. 644–655, 2015.
[12] G. Kellaris et al., “Generic attacks on secure outsourced databases,” in
CCS, pp. 1329–1340, 2016.
[13] V. Costan and S. Devadas, “Intel SGX explained,” IACR Cryptology
ePrint Archive, vol. 2016, p. 86, 2016.
[14] T. T. A. Dinh et al., “M2R: enabling stronger privacy in mapreduce
computation,” in USENIX, pp. 447–462, 2015.
[15] F. Schuster et al., “VC3: trustworthy data analytics in the cloud using
SGX,” in SP, pp. 38–54, 2015.
[16] W. Zheng et al., “Opaque: An oblivious and encrypted distributed
analytics platform,” in NSDI, pp. 283–298, 2017.
[17] C. Priebe et al., “EnclaveDB: A secure database using SGX,” in SP,
pp. 264–278, 2018.
[18] W. Wang et al., “Leaky cauldron on the dark land: Understanding
memory side-channel hazards in SGX,” in CCS, pp. 2421–2434, 2017.
[19] J. Go¨tzfried et al., “Cache attacks on Intel SGX,” in EUROSEC, pp. 2:1–
2:6, 2017.
[20] M. Shih et al., “T-SGX: eradicating controlled-channel attacks against
enclave programs,” in NDSS, 2017.
[21] V. Costan et al., “Sanctum: Minimal hardware extensions for strong
software isolation,” in USENIX Security, pp. 857–874, 2016.
[22] K. Zhang et al., “Sedic: privacy-aware data intensive computing on
hybrid clouds,” in CCS, pp. 515–526, 2011.
[23] K. Y. Oktay et al., “SEMROD: secure and efficient MapReduce over
hybrid clouds,” in SIGMOD, pp. 153–166, 2015.
[24] K. Y. Oktay et al., “Secure and efficient query processing over hybrid
clouds,” in ICDE, pp. 733–744, 2017.
[25] http://www.computerworld.com/article/2834193/cloud-computing/
5-tips-for-building-a-successful-hybrid-cloud.html.
[26] https://www.getfilecloud.com/blog/2015/07/
5-tips-on-optimizing-your-hybrid-cloud/.
[27] C. Farkas and S. Jajodia, “The inference problem: A survey,” SIGKDD
Explorations, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 6–11, 2002.
[28] T. H. Hinke, “Inference aggregation detection in database management
systems,” in SP, pp. 96–106, 1988.
[29] G. W. Smith, “Modeling security-relevant data semantics,” in SP,
pp. 384–391, 1990.
[30] G. Lee et al., “Hiding sensitive patterns in association rules mining,” in
COMPSAC, pp. 424–429, 2004.
[31] C. Li et al., “Protecting individual information against inference attacks
in data publishing,” in DASFAA, pp. 422–433, 2007.
[32] H. Pang and X. Ding, “Privacy-preserving ad-hoc equi-join on out-
sourced data,” TODS, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 23:1–23:40, 2014.
[33] P. Martins et al., “A survey on fully homomorphic encryption: An
engineering perspective,” CSUR, vol. 50, no. 6, pp. 83:1–83:33, 2017.
[34] S. Mehrotra et al., “Partitioned data security on outsourced sensitive and
non-sensitive data,” tech. rep. http://isg.ics.uci.edu/publications.html.
[35] Stealth SDB, available at:http://www.stealthsoftwareinc.com/.
[36] R. Canetti et al., “Adaptively secure multi-party computation,” in STOC,
pp. 639–648, 1996.
[37] D. W. Archer et al., “From keys to databases–real-world applications of
secure multi-party computation,” eprint.iacr.org/2018/450.pdf.
13 ICDE, 2019.
